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An application of Ramsey model in transition economy: a Russian case study 
 
1.  Introduction 
After many years of chaotic market reforms, Russia has developed a unique industrial 
organization. Although it has departed radically from the centrally planned system of the 
communist period, it is still quite different from what can be found in a market economy at a 
comparable level of development.  Natural monopolies, including the United Energy System in 
the generation and transmission of electricity, Gazprom in the production and distribution of 
natural gas, and the Ministry of Railroads in transportation dominate the newly emerging 
industrial structure.  Pricing in most of these natural monopolies is a rather peculiar combination 
of federal and local government regulations and classical monopolistic rent seeking. 
The focus of our case study is two fold: first, to investigate whether the current prices 
used by the regional affiliates of the world’s largest public utility, United Energy System, are 
socially optimal. and second, to evaluate if the current prices could be chosen better. It is well 
known that socially the most optimal pricing is marginal cost pricing. However, it is not 
appropriate in the case of a natural monopoly because marginal-cost pricing results in deficit or 
losses due to high fixed costs. Hence, in practice, a cost-plus pricing is used in Russia. Different 
consumers pay different prices. The prices for households and the agriculture are set lower than 
for industrial users. Such price discrimination results in cross-subsidies - - some consumers or 
groups of consumers subsidize the others.  The industrial users pay almost one and a half times 
more than the residential users, which is in sharp contrast with western Europe, where industrial 
tariffs are on average two-thirds of the price charged to households, reflecting the relative costs of 
supplying to these two customers.  
For a natural monopoly, prices based on the Ramsey model are considered optimal 
because prices are set to maximize social welfare and at the same time, to allow the natural 
monopoly to cover the total cost. If the prices were set at cost-recovery levels, there would be an   3
increase in efficiency. The increased efficiency should occur in both the residential sector and 
industry. The households will have incentive to regulate their energy consumption, while the 
industrial users will invest in energy-efficient production methods. In the Ramsey model, fixed 
costs are covered largely by the consumers who are willing to pay and by those consumers who 
are more costly to serve. Thus, Ramsey pricing provides a second-best solution. The use of 
Ramsey pricing has been analyzed for natural monopolies in postal services and transportation 
industry (see, for example, Scott, 1986, Cuthbertson and Dobbs, 1996 and Train, 1997).
1  
In practice, the Ramsey pricing model has two limitations. First, the regulating agency (in 
the case of Russia the Russian Energy Commission, REC) must have information about demands 
for different users and the cost function of the electric utilities. Second, the Ramsey model 
maximizes consumer surplus without taking into consideration the distribution of consumer 
surpluses among different groups of users. However, the distribution of consumer surplus may  be 
just as important for the society, especially when the subsequent redistribution is difficult. Our 
case study shows that, in spite of its limitations, the Ramsey model can be useful in analyzing a 
regional monopoly. 
Most of the existing studies of natural monopolies in the Russian transition economy 
focus on institutional changes related to re-organization and the partial privatization of utilities in 
the 1990s (see Ordover et al., 1996; Slay and Capelic, 1998; Kryukov, 1998; Galiev, 2000, 2001). 
Other studies focus on technical aspects of efficiency of utilities, such as trends of energy 
consumption per unit of GDP and the role of the energy sector in economic development (see 
Suslov, 1996; Brock, 1999; Kerr, 1999; Melamed and Suslov, 2000). A recent study by the 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (2001) surveys energy policy issues in the 
former USSR and other East European countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of Russian 
electricity markets. Section 3 focuses on the pricing of electricity and its regulatory environment. 
                                                           
1 For a theoretical discussion see Vicussi, Vernon and Harrington (2000).   4
Section 4 provides estimations of demand functions and an analysis of the costs of a regional 
electric utility. Section 5 uses the Ramsey model to check the optimality of prices. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Production and distribution of electricity in Russia 
This section provides a brief overview of the electricity markets in Russia. The 
government, which maintains a controlling interest in natural monopolies in energy sector, views 
these monopolies as more than just producers.  Following the historical patterns developed under 
central planning, the government also considers them as agents of social support for the 
population at large.  Forced by the government to perform multiple functions unrelated to their 
primary role as producers, the Russian natural monopolies often have to sacrifice profitability and 
efficiency in their operations.  
2.1. Suppliers of electricity in Russia  
From the former USSR, Russia inherited a considerable portion of the power generation 
facilities and distribution networks previously known as the United Energy System.
2 Currently, 
the Russian territory is divided into 72 regional electricity markets, most of which are connected 
by a common power grid. The grid is managed jointly by a Central Dispatch Office in Moscow 
and the respective regional dispatch offices. Inter-regional electricity sales are estimated at 10% 
of the total output, although this figure is higher in some regions.
3 Between 35-40 power 
networks generate electricity internally that do not meet local demand, while 15-20 networks 
have surplus. The remaining networks generally meet their regional demand. Networks with a 
surplus in power generation sell their power to the unified grid at a relatively higher price 
compared to the tariffs they charge to their local consumers.  
                                                           
2 A good historical review of the development of the Soviet energy system is offered in Campbell (1980) 
and Nove (1983). 
3 For example, in Western Siberian regions of Altai, Omsk, and Novosibirsk.    5
In 1992, the government started privatization and began to restructure the electricity 
suppliers. Regional energy companies, the so-called regional Energos, were incorporated. Among 
the multiple shareholders of each regional company were both the local government and 
industrial enterprises. To preserve the integrity of the electrical supply system, the federal 
government created a holding company, United Energy System of Russia (UES), at the national 
level. The UES retained the national power grid and most of the higher capacity power plants of 
various regional Energos.  
A Board of Directors, which includes a Chair appointed by the federal government and 
several regional representatives, controls operations of the UES. The federal government owns 
52% of UES and has transferred up to 30% of the rest to the regional governments. The UES 
owns between 49-100% of regional Energos. This complicated ownership and operational 
relationship between UES and regional Energos represents a compromise between the central and 
regional interests.
4 
  For the most part, the restructuring enabled the government to preserve the integrated 
nature of the Russian electricity supply system. However, UES does not have monopoly control 
over all of its major assets. Some politically and economically influential provinces were able to 
retain all of their power-generating plants under the control of their own Energos thus limiting 
their relationship with UES to only rental payments for the usage of power plants and other 
equipments. Most of the nuclear power plants were transferred to the Rosenergoatom, a separate 
government holding company at the federal level under the Ministry of Atomic Energy. Thus at 
present, the main suppliers in the Russian electricity sector are: 
 The joint stock company, Unified Energy System of Russia (RAO-EES Rossii) ; 
 The 72 Regional Distribution Companies (Energos); and  
                                                           
4 For a more detailed description of the United Energy System and its organization, see Suslov (1996); 
Melamed and Suslov (2000).    6
 The nuclear power operator, Rosenergoatom.  
Tables 1 and 2 below show the capacity and generation of electricity in Russia. 
 




Table 2. Production of electricity in Russia by (in billion of kWh) by energy sources for 1980-
2001.  
About here 
2.2. Consumers of electricity in Russia 
The major groups of consumers with their respective shares of consumption of electricity 
(based on 1992-97 period) are as follows.  
 Industrial enterprises (50-55%);  
 Transportation companies (more than 10-15%);  
 Service sector enterprises (10-15%);  
 Residential sector/households (10-15%); and   
 Farmers and agriculture sector (8-12%).  
In the 1990s, the overall output of electricity in Russia decreased compared to earlier periods. 
This decrease can mainly be attributed to the decline in industrial production. Only the household   7
sector posted an increase in consumption in the 1990s. But this increase in household 
consumption was not large enough to reverse the general downward trend. 
2.3. Inefficiency in the Russian power-generating system 
The overall decrease in output of electricity in the 1990s resulted in under-utilization of 
the most cost-efficient hydroelectric power plants (see Brock, 1999).  At present, they operate on 
average at 40-43% of capacity, while the more costly thermal plants have capacity utilization of 
48-50%. The aggregated operational loss in thermal electricity production is estimated at 1,474 
billion rubles, the equivalent of 21.4% of all electricity sales.  
Another aspect of inefficiency is the continuing increase in employment in the industry in 
spite of the fact that electricity production is declining. Between 1990 and 2001, production of 
electricity in Russia dropped by 18%. At the same time the number of employed in the electricity 
generation sector increased from 545,000 to 942,000, or by 72% (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Indicators of electricity sector in the Russian economy for 1980-2001 
About here 
In an effort to increase efficiency in the industry in the late 1990s, the UES developed a 
number of proposals aimed at restructuring the existing system of production and distribution of 
electricity. In the summer of 2001 the government approved the preliminary version of a 
restructuring plan. The plan calls for the full privatization of energy generation capacities and the 
separation of energy generation from the “pure” natural monopoly functions—transmission and 
distribution of electricity.  The declared goal of the plan was to develop a competitive electricity 
market in Russia in the next three to four years. Further development of the program, however, 
called for overcoming the conflicting interests of UES and its regional affiliates (see Galiev, 
2000, 2001; Rubchenko, 2001). After a long search for a compromise in February 2003, the 
Russian Duma approved the government plan of reform in the electric power generating industry. 
When the implementation of this plan begins, the tariffs will still be regulated. Retails sales (to   8
the final users) of electric power will remain a monopoly and will be regulated by the government 
agency. It is possible, however, that several retail companies will be allowed to operate in the 
same region. 
 
3. Pricing of electricity 
3.1. Pricing policies and government regulation in electricity markets 
The pricing of electricity by natural monopolies in Russia is affected by both federal and 
local government regulations. Although tariffs remain uniform for the same type of users (e.g., 
agriculture, industrial or residential users), different tariffs are charged to different users. 
Effectively, price discrimination combined with regional cross-subsidization is practiced.  
In response to a general deregulation of prices in 1992, the regional Energos began to charge 
tariffs with the aim to fully recover the costs of electricity generation.  At this point, they also 
started to purchase surplus electricity in the wholesale market instead of receiving it through 
central plan allocation, the practice used prior to 1992. In the same year, to regulate wholesale 
tariffs of electricity, including the power generated by the nuclear power plants, a Federal Energy 
Commission was established under the Ministry of Economy. The Federal Energy Commission 
also serves as a Board of Appeals to resolve regional tariff disputes (Kryukov, 1998; Slay and 
Capelic, 1998; Melamed and Suslov, 2000). 
The regulation of retail electricity tariffs was relegated to the Regional Energy Commissions 
established by the regional governments. In theory, these Regional Energy Commissions are 
supposed to follow the directives of the Federal Energy Commission in Moscow. In practice, 
however, the regional governments usually control the retail tariffs. 
Regional differences in electricity tariffs are significant. The highest tariffs are found in the 
Far East of Russia, where both fuel and fuel transportation costs tend to be relatively high. The   9
lowest-cost regions are generally ones where hydroelectric plants are located. In some regions, 
low-cost hydroelectric power plants meet over half of the regional demand. The differences in 
tariffs between different types of customers are also considerable, and cross-subsidization is 
widespread. However, peak load pricing is generally not used.  
Actual tariffs charged by utility companies are significantly affected by non-monetary 
transactions and non-payments. Since the start of market reforms in 1992, the three primary non-
monetary means of payment have been barter, inter-firm arrears (or offsets) and promissory notes 
(veksels). According to various sources, prior to the devaluation of ruble in 1998, barter 
accounted for 30-80% of inter-firm transactions (Aukutzionek, 1998; Karpov, 1997; Gaddy and 
Ickes, 1999).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that natural monopolies were heavily engaged in 
barter (Guriev, and Kvasov, 2001).  In the mid 1990s, UES reported cash receipts as low as 10% 
of total revenue. After the 1998 devaluation of the ruble, the problem of non-payment has 
subsided and the share of cash revenues for UES has gone up to 40%. The remaining 60%, 
however, is still being paid in promissory notes and in barter.  Since 1994, the government allows 
the Energos to cut off power for non-paying customers. However, the current regulation specified 
by the Federal Energy Commission provides for numerous exceptions. These exceptions include 
residential, communal, military, and other types of customers. Many local administrations have 
also opposed interruptions of electric service because of the risk of social unrest.  
3.2. Electricity market in the Novosibirsk region 
The region of Novosibirsk (population 2.9 million), which is the focus of this study, is one of 
the more industrially developed Russian regions east of the Ural Mountains. Having relatively 
few mineral resources of its own, the Novosibirsk region specializes in manufacturing primarily 
machine tools, chemicals, non-ferrous metallurgy, construction materials, and food processing. 
The city of Novosibirsk (population 1.6 million) is the third largest city in Russia (after Moscow 
and St. Petersburg). It serves as the main transportation and trade center for the entire Siberian 
region and is considered the unofficial capital of Siberia.    10
The regional utility company Novosibirskenergo is a joint stock company. The electricity 
generated by Novosibirskenergo covers about two thirds of the needs of business and residential 
consumers in the area. The rest of the electricity supplied is purchased from the neighboring 
Krasnoyarsk region, one of Russia’s energy surplus regions in Eastern Siberia. Novosibirskenergo 
controls 100% of the regional distribution of electricity and about 50% of the production and the 
distribution of heat. In this paper our focus is only on electricity (see Section 4.4 below). 
As is typical in other regions of Russia, regional tariffs for electricity in Novosibirsk are set 
through a bargaining process between the regional administration and the federal electricity 
monopoly, United Energy System (UES). Nominally, the Regional Energy Commission and the 
Federal Energy Commission, an administrative body within the Ministry of Economy, conduct 
negotiations.  
Prices are set separately for six types of consumers: (i) industrial enterprises (large and 
small); (ii) households (urban and rural); (iii) railways and urban transportation companies;  
(iv) the agricultural sector; (v) non-industrial enterprises (health care, educational, cultural and 
government facilities); and (vi) wholesalers. Significant regulatory control and a complex market 
structure make efficient nonlinear pricing strategies difficult to design and implement. Because 
the Ramsey model requires estimates of elasticities of demand for various users, we estimate 
demand functions to get the estimates of elasticities.  
 
4. Estimation of elasticity of demand  
Theoretically, with the Ramsey model, it is more appropriate to maximize social welfare 
in the long-run by using long-run demand elasticities. In the long-run, efficiency in energy usage 
due to changes in the number and quality of electric appliances can be incorporated. However, 
existing data do not allow us to capture many of these long-run changes. Therefore, we are 
limited to estimating only the short-run elasticity, which reflects consumers’ reaction to changes 
in prices in the first few months. However, it is reasonable to suggest that consumers who are   11
more inclined to save energy in the short-run would also be inclined to use the more energy-
saving appliances in the long-run. On the other hand, as long run changes in energy-saving 
appliances can be expensive and may take years to acquire, it may not be feasible to incorporate 
many such effects in the rapidly changing environment of a transition economy. Therefore, it may 
be justified to focus on maximizing social welfare in the short-term. A study focusing on the long 
run effects would be an important extension of our work. 
4.1 Data sources 
The data cover the period from December 1992 to June 2000. Monthly data on tariffs and 
electricity consumption for different users in the Novosibirsk region are obtained from the 
internal records of Novosibirskenergo. Table 4 and Figure 1 provide some descriptive statistics 
related to electricity consumption in the region. Monthly and quarterly data for production costs 
of the energy are also obtained from internal records of Novosibirskenergo. Monthly data for 
inflation level, industrial prices and real household income in the region are obtained from the 
published sources of the Novosibirsk Statistical Bureau.  
 




Figure 1. Shares of different users in total electricity consumption in Novosibirsk Region, 1992-
99 (total consumption =1) 
About here 
 
Electric power consumption data are seasonally adjusted. Seasonal adjustment was done 
using methods such as the Eviews-Census XII package, the ratio of moving averages, and by 
utilizing seasonal dummy variables. The results turned out to be essentially the same.   12
All time series were found to be non-stationary. Therefore, we measure increments in 
first differences in logarithms, which is generally considered stationary. Although we have data 
from December 1992 through June 2000, percentage changes in price show a much greater 
dispersion from December 1992 to November 1995 than in the remaining period.  As a result, the 
variance of the price variable was found to be not constant. Because of this problem with the data, 
we use data only for the later period, starting from December 1995. During this period, 
percentage changes in power consumption exhibit the following behavior: a decrease in any 
preceding month is followed by an increase in the following month. This pattern suggests that 
aggregate power consumption returns to a certain “normal” level, which appears to be influenced 
by many factors such as the type and condition of home appliances, living conditions, and habits.  
This tendency is clearly reflected in the data. We model this pattern using lagged-dependent 
variable. Besides the effect of price, this approach allows us to capture the influence of changes in 
other factors on the changes in consumption, not just from the initial moment of change but over 
several periods. Thus, the overall cumulative impact of price changes and other factors on 
consumption can differ from the initial. 
4.2. Estimation of elasticity of demand for households  
We specify the following model. 
logEt = logEt* – AlogEt-1 - logE*t-1+ B(L)logP +D(L)logI. 
Where, Et is the current level of consumption, Et* is the ‘normal’ level of consumption, B(L) and 
D(L) are lagged-polynomials. The relative price P = Ph/Pc, where Ph is the nominal price of 
electricity for households , Pc is the consumer price index, and I is the real income of households. 
Because the increments are measured in first differences in logarithms, the above specification is 
modified as:  
dlogEt =dlog(Et* +A logE*t-1) - A dlogEt-1+  B(L)dlogP +D(L)dlogI.   13
Data for (Et*) is not available. However, if we assume that it varies at a constant rate then a 
constant C can replace the first term on the right-hand side. The level of household electricity 
consumption goes up slightly at the end of 1997, and falls slightly from the beginning of 1998. It 
is impossible to explain this by using the dynamics of prices and incomes alone. So we introduce 
a dummy variable C1, which equals 0 up to December 1998 and equals 1 since January 1998. 
The final equation for estimation becomes a dynamic regression given below: 
dlogEt = C + C1 – A dlogEt - 1 + B(L)dlogP +D(L)dlogI         (1) 
Table 5 gives the results of estimation. 
 
Table 5.  Estimation of elasticity of demand for households 
About here 
 
Results of the estimation show that price changes influence electricity consumption 
without a lag, while income does not have any noticeable influence on the short-term fluctuations 
of electricity consumption of households. The coefficient of the relative price variable B, which 
equals -0.256 can be interpreted as the “instant” elasticity, reflecting changes in power 
consumption in the same month as the changes in prices. The short-run elasticity Eh  = B/(1+A) 
takes into consideration the change in consumption, which occurs for some months after the 
change in tariffs, where A is the coefficient of the lagged-dependent variable.  Based on our 
estimation, the short-term elasticity for households E h = -0.256/(1+0.461) = -0.17 
The "normal" level of consumption can be interpreted as the level, to which consumption 
tends to return after it has changed due to changes in tariffs. The effect of price changes on 
energy consumption is most significant in the same month. During the following 3-4 months, the 
effect of a price change on energy consumption is almost dampened, but the final effect on   14
consumption during this time period is lower than the initial one. A plausible explanation could 
be that the desire to save more expensive energy partially vanishes with time because  changes in 
the relative price explain only about 5-8 % of consumption changes (excluding seasonality). 
Changes in real income do not affect changes in energy use in the short-run. Real income may 
play a role in defining the "normal" level of consumption, but it is difficult to quantify. For the 
period under consideration, it appears that the “normal level” is determined largely by other 
factors (e.g., quantity and quality of home appliances). 
4.3 Estimation of elasticity of demand for industrial users  
The electricity demand for industrial users is estimated in a similar fashion. In this case, 
electricity prices for industry are deflated by the index of industrial prices PN in Novosibirsk 
region. Thus P = Pi/ PN . The most desirable approach to estimate industrial energy demand 
should include the prices of other resources and output prices in the regression equation. 
Unfortunately such detailed data are not available. Therefore, we use a general index PN that 
serves as a proxy for all relevant prices. All other definitions remain the same as in (1). Table 6 
contains the results of estimation. The short-run elasticity of demand for industrial enterprises Ei 
= -0.596/(1+1.495) = -0.40. From the estimated values of elasticities, we can conclude that 
industry demand is more price-sensitive (more elastic) than households. This conclusion is 
consistent with estimates of elasticities in mature market economies. 
 
Table 6. Estimation of elasticity of demand for industrial users 
About here 
 
4.4 Test for the equality of two elasticities 
All coefficients of demand elasticity are statistically significant and less than one. We test 
the null hypothesis Ei = Bi/(1+Ai) = Bh/(1+Ah) = Eh , where Bi , Ai  Bh  and Ah  are the coefficients 
from the demand equations of industry and households.  Using the Wald test, the null hypothesis   15
is rejected at a significance level of 95%. The χ
2 value equals 4.1957 with probability equal to 
0.04. 
 
4.5 Cost function 
With regard to the cost function of electrical utilities we make the following assumptions. 
We assume that the variable costs are represented only by the costs of fuel and additional power 
purchased from other firms. All other costs, including salaries of workers, are treated as fixed 
costs as they are not directly related to the volume of output, at least in the short-term. Although 
Novosibirskenergo supplies electricity along with heat, a special method is used to separate costs 
of electricity production. In our analysis we used the cost data for electricity only.  
For costs we have only quarterly data, which is insufficient because the seasonal effects 
cannot be adjusted. Hence a cost function cannot be estimated. The unavailability of detailed data 
on costs is a usual problem in studies similar to ours. Therefore, in order to have meaningful 
estimates of costs, it is necessary to make certain assumptions and then investigate how the 
results might change by relaxing the assumptions. 
We do have information about the total variable costs. Therefore, it is possible to 
calculate average variable costs based on the total output, regardless of the consumer type. 
However, there is some evidence showing that distribution costs of energy are different for 
different types of consumers. For example, for the more dispersed networks, energy losses are 
greater. According to existing estimates, the variable costs of providing energy to households are 
approximately 1.5 times higher than for other consumers. 
Simple comparison of the available data reveals that the cost of fuel per unit of energy 
rises with the increase in energy output. However, some part of this increase is due to the fact that 
the percentage of energy loss is higher during the cold winter quarters when output is also higher.  
At the same time, if we compare average variable costs in the same season (e.g., winter) for 
different years, it is possible to see that these costs are somewhat higher when energy output is   16
higher. This is due to the fact that a higher level of production and distribution of energy results 
in a relatively higher percentage loss. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that average variable 
and marginal costs will be rise slightly with the increase in output and the marginal cost will be 
somewhat higher than the average variable cost. 
 
5. The  Ramsey model 
Now we can compare existing prices using the Ramsey model.  Initially, we assume that   
the marginal costs of production are equal to the average variable costs and are also equal for all 
types of consumers. That is MC = MCi  = MCh  = AVC. We relax this assumption later to 
investigate how the conclusions change. It is reasonable to assume that because the demands of 
household and industrial users are independent, the cross-price elasticities are zero. 
Because, all estimated values of demand elasticities are less than unity, the prices charged 
cannot be profit-maximizing prices under monopoly.  Thus the monopoly is restricted by the 
regulatory agencies from charging profit-maximizing prices.  If we assume that the goal of the 
regulatory bodies is to maximize the social welfare, allowing the monopoly to fully recover the 
total costs, then under the Ramsey rule, the prices and marginal costs must satisfy the following 















       ( 2 )  
 
Eh and Ei are the demand elasticity coefficients for households and industry, respectively, Ph and 
Pi are the (real) prices charged and MC is the marginal cost. In our case, household price must 
exceed marginal cost to a greater degree than the industrial price for the Ramsey ratio to be 
optimal.  If prices were to be optimal, the ratio R must equal Eh/Ei   = -0.17/-0.40 = 0.425. The 
actual values of R are shown in Figure 2. Our estimates show that for the observed period, R is   17
greater than 1 (see Figure 2). Not shown are the situations where household prices were lower 
than the marginal cost. 
 
Figure 2. Estimated Ramsey ratio.  
About here 
 
Now consider the case when MC = MCi = MCh   > AVC.  For this case, the left side of the 
equation (2) would be even higher and the Ramsey ratios would be even farther from the optimal 
value 0.425. For the opposite situation when MC = MCi = MCh  < AVC, (or even significantly 
lower than the average variable costs), the left side of the equation (2) will be lower but still 
greater than one because the household price is consistently lower than the industrial price. As in 
the previous case, the Ramsey ratios would not correspond to the optimal value. Finally, suppose 
that the marginal costs for different groups of consumers are not equal. Because they are higher 
for households (MCi  < MCh ), it is evident that the left side of equation (2) would again be higher 
than one, and the Ramsey ratios would not equal the optimal value 0.425.  
5.1 Robustness of the Ramsey Ratio 
To test the robustness of the optimal Ramsey ratio obtained from our estimation one can 
use the following approach. The elasticities values are calculated based on the four coefficients in 
the estimated demand functions. Instead of using the point estimates, one can construct a 95% 
confidence interval and see how the Ramsey ratios would fluctuate with the varying coefficient 
values within that interval. Table 7 below presents the results.  
  Table 7 shows that although variations in elasticities estimates provide for a considerable 
variation in R, the latter always remains below one. Therefore, we can conclude that even 
allowing for a wide difference in the magnitude of marginal cost and for imprecision in estimates 
of elasticities, the current prices for electric power are not optimal. A substantial increase in the   18
prices for households (69-192%) and a decrease in prices for industrial users (23-56%) are 
necessary to correct the situation. 
 




From our investigation, the policy implication from an efficiency standpoint is rather 
straightforward. In the Novosibirsk region, based on the social welfare criteria, prices for 
industrial users must be lowered and those for households increased. However, this goal might be 
difficult to achieve politically because price increase for households must take into consideration 
the affordability of those households living at or below subsistence level. Thus, the level of 
poverty in the population and the share of energy expenditure in households’ budgets become 
significant factors in a trade-off between price reforms aimed at efficiency, on the one hand and 
affordability, on the other. If the household tariff were to be increased and industry tariff lowered, 
there would be a redistribution of consumer surplus from households to industrial users, resulting 
in a reduction in the deadweight loss. However, the magnitude of overall welfare gain that would 
result from these price changes cannot be estimated based just on these two groups of electricity 
users (households and industry) because together they represent about 50% of consumption in the 
region. It is also important to note that at present, a large part of welfare distribution in favor of 
households goes to families with higher income levels, which does not correspond to the declared 
goals of redistribution policies. Thus, for policy purposes, the relevant issue is the choice between 
an increase in overall social welfare through a change in pricing, or preservation of a sub-optimal 
pricing structure, which retains freedom of redistribution of consumer surplus by regulatory 
agencies.    19
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Table 1 
Electricity generating capacity in Russia by source of energy, 1980-2001, in millions of kW 
 
  1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total  165.4    195.8 213.3 213.0 212.0 213.4 214.9 215  214.5 214.2 214.1 214.3 212.8 214.8 
Thermal 121.1 137.3 149.7 149.5 148.4 148.8 149.7 149.7 149.2 149  148.7 148.3 146.8 147.4 
Hydro  35.1 41.5 43.4 43.3 43.4 43.4 44  44  44  43.9 44.1 44.3 44.3 44.7 
Nuclear  9.2  17.0 20.2 20.2 20.2 21.2 21.2 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.7 21.7 22.7 




Production of electricity in Russia by source of energy, 1980-2001, in billions of kWh 
 
  1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total  805 962 1082  1068  1008  957 876 860 847 834 827 846 878 891 
Thermal  622 703 797 780 715 663 601 583 582 567 564 563 582 578 
Hydro 129 160 167 168 173 175 177 177 155 158 159 161 165 176 
Nuclear  54  100 118 120 120 119 98  99  109 109 104 122 131 137 
 
Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2000, p. 320; 2002, p. 358. 
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Table 3 
Some indicators of electricity sector of the Russian economy, 1980-2001 
 
  1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number of 
enterprises. 
1006 849  887  943  895  1096 1165 1130 1242 1289 1528 1431 1464 
Number of 
employed, 000 




358 404 416 465 494 530 560 588 597 629    657    672 692 
 
Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2000, p. 318; 2002, p. 358.    24
Table 4 
Electricity consumption and prices in Novosibirsk region: 1995:03-2000:06 
 
 Variable   Mean   Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.
Household electricity consumption, 1000 kWh's.  147401.1 253597  105033  25691.92 
Household electricity prices, rubles.  0.102735 0.268046  0.016572  0.054219 
Relative household electricity prices (deflator - 
inflation index) 
0.812505 1.367831 0.321237  0.261652 
Industry electricity consumption, 1000 kWh's.  245152  357277  161577  44502.34 
Industry electricity prices, rubles.  0.25933  0.3878813  0.101422  0.064984 
Relative industry electricity prices (deflator -  
index of industrial prices) 
0.893351 1.159971 0.575943  0.169776 
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Table 5 
Dependent variable: dlogEt 
Period: 1995:03 - 2000:06 
64 observations 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error t-statistic  Probability 
dlogEt-1 -0.461851  0.106812  -4.323957  0.0001 
dlog(P = Pe/Pc)   -0.256443  0.097834  -2.621216  0.0111 
C  0.021444 0.020323 1.055133  0.2956 
C1 -0.031357  0.029488  -1.063397  0.2919 
R
2  0.315684      F-statistic  9.226281 
Adj. R
2  0.281469      Probablity (F-statistic)  0.000042 
Model is tested for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, functional form, and 
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Table 6 
Dependent variable: dlogEt 
Period: 1995:03 - 2000:06 
64 observations 
Variable Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Probability 
dlogEt-1 -0.494957  0.096289  -5.140303  0.0000 
DlogP -0.596473  0.122615  -4.864606  0.0000 
C -0.002143  0.009543  -0.224616  0.8230 
R
2 0.437941  F-statistic  23.76479 
Adj. R
2  0.419513 Probability  (F-stat.)  0.000000 
Model is tested for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, functional form and 
normal distribution of residuals. 
   27
 
Table 7 

















- 2 s.e. 
R = Eh/Ei 
for top 
border 
R = Eh/Ei 
for bottom 
border 
Demand function for the households 
DlogEt-1 -0.461 0.106 -0.249 -0.673 0.513 0.383 
DlogP -0.256  0.097 -0.062 -0.45 0.106 0.772 
Demand function for the industry 
dlogEt-1 -0.494 0.096 -0.302 -0.686 0.382 0.495 
dlogP  -0.596 0.122 -0.352 -0.84 0.743 0.311 
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Figure 1. Shares of different users in total electricity consumption in 












































Figure 2. Estimated Ramsey ratios. Baseline 0.425 corresponds to the optimal ratio of Eh/Ei= 
0.425 
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